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After Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait during the Second Gulf War, questions were raised as 
to who was responsible for helping Saddam Hussein build up the vast military machine 
that called forth the combined might of the international community to bring about its 
defeat.  Mark Phythian, a lecturer in Politics at the School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences at Wolverhampton, England, seeks to answer this question in his book Arming 
Iraq.  At first glance, his contention that the US and Britain are to blame appears 
misplaced.  He cites SIPRI estimates of Iraqi imports of major weapon systems showing 
that Baghdad imported some $25 billion worth of weapons from 1980 to 1989.  The 
American share of this cumulative total was approximately one per cent while that of the 
British was a paltry .07 percent.  Imports from the USSR, on the other hand, accounted 
for nearly 54 percent of the total.  Surely, it would have been more accurate to sub-title 
the book "How the USSR built Saddam's war machine."  
Nevertheless, as Phythian demonstrates, open and direct arms sales were only the tip of 
the iceberg in a vast effort to funnel weapons to Iraq.  Manufacturers used various 
deceptions to mask officially prohibited exports to that country including false end-user 
certificates and misleading shipment descriptions among others.  In addition, friendly 
countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were used as "conduits" or 
intermediate stops on the road that ultimately led to Iraq.  
The deceit and subterfuge surrounding arms exports to Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Iran) 
make for a story that is, at times, complex.  This, however, is not the fault of the 
narrative.  It is simply the nature of the labyrinthine world of the international arms 
trade.  The chapter concerning British munitions manufacturer Astra Holdings plc, for 
example, describes a complicated web of personalities and institutions involved in the 
Iraq arms trade, including government departments, intelligence agencies and the 
military, holding companies and their domestic and foreign subsidiaries, cartels, and 
merchant banks.  In this convoluted tale, "you can't tell the players without a program," 
which Phythian helpfully provides in a selected list of acronyms and "dramatis personae" 
found at the beginning of the book.  
Phythian explains in great detail how the secret arms trade with Iraq was carried on.  He 
is equally dutiful in addressing the why.  Both the US and Britain officially adopted a 
neutral stance during the Iran-Iraq War as well as a policy prohibiting arms sales that 
would prolong the conflict.  Yet, in practice, they supplied weapons to both sides, tilting 
in favor of Iraq after the Iranians turned the tide of the war in 1982.  According to 
Phythian, there were several reasons for this pro-Iraqi bias.  In geopolitical terms, London 
and Washington wanted to maintain the pro-Western status quo in the Persian Gulf.  
They did not want either Iran or Iraq to dominate the Gulf and its vital oil resources.  
Thus, when it appeared that Iran was gaining the upper hand, they began to increase their 
material, intelligence, and diplomatic support for Iraq.  In economic terms, Iraq was a 
lucrative market upon which many firms and jobs depended.  Thus, despite Baghdad's 
increasingly objectionable behavior, such as gassing its Kurds in 1988, the two 
governments were loathe to criticize Baghdad and risk losing access to this important 
market.  Finally, as argued in Britain, the conventional arms relationship with Iraq 
provided intelligence agencies with a window on its more worrisome non-conventional 
weapons programs, though, paradoxically, the British government did not act on 
intelligence gained through these channels for fear of exposing its sources.  Thus, the 
rationales for the illicit arms trade with Iraq were many.  It remains an open question 
whether these reasons were sufficient to justify, in Britain at least, a duplicitous policy 
that had as a corollary deliberately misleading the House of Commons and denying 
private businessmen implicated in the government-condoned arms trade critical 
documents needed for their legal defence.  
Arming Iraq is an excellent case-study of the international arms trade, exposing some of 
the more unsavory elements in this deadly traffic.  However, it also highlights a broader 
foreign policy phenomenon: the penchant of states to create "monsters" that serve their 
short-term interests only to come back to haunt their "creators" in the longer run.  In the 
case of Iraq, the West deluded itself into believing that Baghdad had moderated its 
militaristic ambitions in the Persian Gulf and, after the Iran-Iraq war, could serve as a 
guardian of the regional order against the Iranian fundamentalist threat.  Its invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990 exploded this fantasy.  
Iraq is only the most glaring example of this unfortunate state practice.  Others could be 
added to the list.  Throughout the 1980s, for example, US intelligence employed 
Panamanian strong-man General Manuel Noriega as an informant on Cuba and as a 
supporter of the Nicaraguan Contra rebels.  In his "spare time," however, he also worked 
with Latin American drug cartels smuggling illegal drugs into the US  No longer able to 
tolerate his criminal and dictatorial activities, American troops invaded Panama in 
December 1989 to apprehend the former intelligence protÄgÄe and return him to face 
justice in the US.  In another example, in the late 1980s, the Israeli government 
encouraged the emergence of Hamas as an organized Islamist challenger to the PLO.  
The intent was to undermine the influence among Palestinians of what was then 
considered to be the most dangerous political-terrorist organization.  With the signing of 
the Oslo accords, however, the PLO became, for better or for worse, Israel's partner for 
peace while Hamas developed into the new and more deadly terrorist foe.  And, finally, 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the US and various 
Arab governments funded and trained religiously-inspired Arabs who traveled to that 
war-torn country to join their Afghan brethren in fighting against their atheistic 
opponents.  After the Soviet withdrawal ten years later, many of these radicalized 
"Afghan Arabs" returned to their homes in Algeria, Egypt, and elsewhere where they 
subsequently launched bloody campaigns of domestic terror and insurrection aimed at 
overthrowing the regimes that had only a few years before had extolled their virtues as 
fighters for Islam.  
Too often, decision makers mistakenly assume that an overlap of short-term interest 
represents a convergence of long-term values.   As in the case of arming Iraq, this is a 
policy that can have disastrous consequences.  
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